Wednesday, December 29, 2010

The Maritime Administration’s U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet Revitalization Study.

From the 12/29 Federal Register:

There will be three public listening session meetings that are being held to gather data and comments to inform the Maritime Administration’s U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet Revitalization Study. The U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet Revitalization Study will examine the current and potential future role of Great Lakes shipping in supporting the region’s economy and as an important component of the greater U.S. Marine Highway system serving the Nation at large. It will also be used to assess the impact of new environmental regulations on the U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet. Of particular interest is the likely impact of the EPA’s final emission standards for new marine diesel ‘‘Category 3’’ engines that goes into effect in January 2012. This study calls for the identification and evaluation of options to recapitalize U.S. vessels and port infrastructure on the Great Lakes, using private and public sector investments, to generate the greatest net benefits for the region and the Nation.

This Maritime Administration study will be a two-phase effort to estimate the costs and options for complying with the new environmental regulations. The first phase will be a data gathering effort. An inventory of current vessel and port assets will be developed. That inventory will be used to determine if the Maritime Administration can assist the U.S. Flag Great Lakes vessel operators in complying with the new regulations.

During the second phase of the study, the Maritime Administration will examine a mix of private and public sector financing options that could be used for vessel or port alterations necessitated by the new environmental regulations. This analysis will be used in developing strategies for how the Maritime Administration might assist the U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet and ports in making those changes. The Maritime Administration will use the study’s findings to develop strategies to promote the U.S.-Flag Great Lakes Fleet and Ports. Stakeholder input is an essential part of the strategy development process, so the study plan includes three stakeholder listening sessions where the important issues raised by the study will be discussed. Topics of discussion include the new EPA environmental regulations such as the Control of Emissions from Category 3 Marine Engines and their impact on Great Lakes vessel operators, the state of the Great Lakes shipping markets, and issues facing vessel operators and port operators.

The three sessions will be held in Duluth, Cleveland, and Chicago. The Cleveland, Ohio, meeting will take place on February 15, 2011, from 8a.m. to 5 p.m., Eastern Daylight Saving Time. The meeting will be held at Hyatt Regency Cleveland at The Arcade, 420 East Superior Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, 44114.Persons interested in attending the meeting should register by February 4, 2011. Registration: The meetings are open to the public. Advanced registration is recommended. To register, interested parties should send their name, group affiliation, and which of the three meetings they will attend to
The meeting agenda will be sent to registered participants.

The Cleveland session is to be held the day before the annual Great Lakes Waterways Conference/Marine Community Days, at the same location. The website for the Waterways Conference is

NMSAC meeting

My colleague Patrick Coyle has published an excellent report of the notice of the next National Maritime Security Advisory Committee meeting, January 19 and 20, 2011, in his blog Chemical Facility Security News at

The notice came out in today's (12/29) Federal Register.

Sunday, December 26, 2010

DHS Semiannual Regulatory Agenda - Update to Subchapter H

On December 20, 2010, DHS published its semiannual regulatory agenda. An item of particular interest to the MTSA community is found on pages 79538 and 79554 of that day’s Federal Register. These pages address the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that contains the updates to Subchapter H, 33 CFR 101 to 106.

The NPRM will incorporate clarifications to MTSA, SAFE Port, and the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006. It will also incorporate feedback received from industry stakeholders, USCG field personnel, and the general public. It will consolidate into regulations policy guidance transmitted through Policy Advisory Council (PAC) decisions, NVIC’s, and MTSA Help Desk responses.

The NPRM will also:

· address screening standards for port facilities and vessels;

· establish security training standards that will be modeled after the courses developed by MARAD and the training standards (mandatory and non-mandatory) and courses developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)

· update existing regulations regarding the areas of maritime security plans, facility and vessel security plans, and facility exercise requirements found in SAFE Port.

The NPRM will incorporate recommendations from MERPAC. Homeport contains an excellent MERPAC reference site at Missions > Ports and Waterways > Safety Advisory Committees > MERPAC

The priority of this NPRM is described as “economically significant.” “Based on preliminary analysis, the Coast Guard determined that 55 percent of operators affected by this rulemaking are small entities. This rulemaking would require operators to incur additional costs for training and exercise provisions.” (Note that screening provisions are not mentioned as a factor that will drive up costs.) In a discussion of anticipated costs and benefits, DHS states, “The Coast Guard is currently estimating the costs associated with this rulemaking. Industry would incur additional costs as a result of provisions for standardized training requirements, updates to security plans and other documentation, and full-scale exercises requirements for high-risk facilities.”

The NPRM will incorporate “various U.S. Maritime Administration and International Maritime Organization voluntary consensus standards related to maritime security training,” a change from “voluntary” to “mandatory” that MARAD has been warning industry about for years.

The action date for the issuance for the NPRM is March 2011.

What all this may mean for the MTSA community:

Screening standards: In speaking of the NPRM, USCG senior personnel described the new standards as “airport-type.” Standards of this type will have a problem surviving the comment process. The USCG admits that 55% of regulated operators are small entities.

Security training standards: There are several training protocols to consider: the MARAD voluntary standards; SAFE Port Act Section 113, and the training standards in Public Law 111–281, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (which repealed SAFE Port Section 113.) In the very bare information given in the 12/20 notice, it appears that the detailed training requirements in SAFE Port and Pub. L. 111-281 may be sidelined in favor of the codification of MARAD’s voluntary course approval process.

Maritime Security Plans: Plans are addressed in Sec. 102 of the SAFE Port Act. Specifically, plans must be resubmitted for approval if there is a change of ownership in a facility that may substantially affect the security of the facility. FSO’s (or “the qualified individual having full authority to implement security actions for a facility”) shall be a citizen of the United States. This requirement can be waived if the individual undergoes a complete background check and a check of all terrorist watch lists. The effectiveness of these plans is supposed to be verified by not one but two annual inspections, one of which is to be unannounced. The USCG is presently substituting spot-checks for the second (unannounced) annual inspection.

Exercises – Exercises are addressed in Sec. 115 of SAFE Port. Each “high risk” facility (MSRAM score, presumably) must conduct a live or full-scale exercise every second year.

The docket number for comment on this rulemaking is USCG-2007-0009. Members of the MTSA community who have an opinion about the NPRM - “for” as well as “against” - should submit comments when it comes out, hopefully in March 2011.

Friday, December 10, 2010

GAO 11-207 Ferry Security Measures

This Dec. 3, 2010 Government Accountability Office Report concerns ferry security. Specifically, the GAO looked at how the USCG assesses risk to ferries and what particular threats were identified. The report also looks at the actions that port security stakeholders such as federal agencies, law enforcement, and ferry operators have taken to protect ferry systems. In putting together the report, the GAO reviewed three years’ of security operations data (2006-2009) and went into the field at five domestic and one international ferry systems of varying sizes. This report is the open-source version of a sensitive document.

Ferry systems are huge contributors to the nation’s transportations system and to the economy. According to respondents to the 2008 National Census of Ferry Operators, ferry systems carried more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles. As such, they are considered prime targets for terrorism. The report states that although “in April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that there have been no credible terrorist threats identified against ferries and their facilities in at least the last 12 months, maritime intelligence officials have identified the presence of terrorist groups with the capability of attacking a ferry. Many of the Coast Guard, ferry system and law enforcement officials GAO spoke with generally believe ferries are vulnerable to passenger- or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, although not all ferry systems transport vehicles. “ The report also states, “Ferries are also potential targets for terrorism in the United States and have been terrorist targets overseas.”

The issues in the report that most concern the wider MTSA community are found in the discussion of security concerns. The report states, “Maritime security stakeholders reported various ferry-related security concerns with the greatest concerns being improvised explosive device attacks delivered via vehicles, passengers or small boats… According to the Coast Guard’s Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, one of the greatest risks associated with maritime scenarios is a direct attack using a waterborne improvised explosive device, and a recurring attack mode has been the use of small boats to carry out an attack.” There is a good discussion of the ripple effect of an attack on a ferry, using the SUPERFERRY 14 as a case study. The method of attack and death toll of that incident are widely known. What is less recognized are the long-term economic consequences of that attack: the decision to deploy sea marshals, which are composite teams of the Armed Forces, National Police and Philippine Coast Guard personnel together with guards from the shipping companies, on board major passengers vessels to provide security while the ships are underway, as well as the cost of “heightened surveillance, investigation, arrest, and detention powers for the police and intelligence services.”

In the risk mitigation section, the GAO looks at Coast Guard actions. The USCG conducts quarterly inspections and “conducts operational activities to secure ferries, including conducting boat escorts of ferries, implementing positive control measures—that is, stationing armed Coast Guard personnel in key locations aboard a vessel to ensure that the operator maintains control—and providing a security presence through various actions.” TSA also supports ferry security by demonstrating a security presence through the VIPRE teams, providing training such as the excellent products produced from its Port and Intermodal Division, and implementing pilot programs involving security technologies. CBP also has a role in securing vessels on international voyages, through deployment of radiation detection technology and through inspection of passengers, bags, vehicles, and crew disembarking at international ferry crossings. Of course owner/operators are responsible for implementation of security assessments and plans and required security measures through MTSA. Discussing observation of screening, GAO observers stated that they encountered a ferry system that did not appear to be screening according to its standards, although the report goes on to state “but we did not determine any failure to meet minimum screening requirements.”

The report notes that ferries are very MTSA-compliant in comparison to other types of vessels (notably excursion tour vessels) and “Coast Guard officials stated that ferry security deficiencies were commonly found in the following areas: security plan audits and amendments; drills and exercises; records and documentation; and access control procedures, including monitoring of secure and restricted areas. “ Access control procedures also include screening, as per 33 CFR 104.265.

For those of us who have attempted without success to speak to the USCG (at the local as well as the HQ level) about the issue of screening, there is interesting information under the headings “The Coast Guard May Be Missing Opportunities to Enhance Ferry Security “ and “The Coast Guard Has Not Evaluated and, if Determined Warranted, Acted on Report Findings and Recommendations .” The report states that the USCG spent $1.5 million on studies of ferry security in 2005 and 2006, and “these studies were aimed at establishing a new benchmark for ferry screening and enhancing the agency’s ability to focus on improving security practices, screening technology, and identification of explosive hazards.” The USCG, however, has “not evaluated and, if determined warranted, taken actions on the ferry security reports.” Results of the studies were communicated to the Commandant, some AMSC’s, and the ports of the 6 systems observed, but there was no general distribution throughout the Sectors. “In May 2010, Coast Guard program officials stated that there were no current actions being taken to address the findings and recommendations from the National Ferry Security Study. Coast Guard officials explained that the ferry security reports were released when the agency was undergoing an internal reorganization and as a result the reports were not sent to the appropriate unit after the reorganization—which they also believe is the likely reason for why no further actions were taken to evaluate or address the reports’ findings and recommendations. “

They also stated that security training, including that if screening personnel, was being addressed in the re-write of Subchapter H, which was begun in late 2006 but delayed by the TWIC program. “In addition, Coast Guard officials stated that they have been developing a Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular for about 2 years to provide updated guidance for ferry screening… Although the officials reported these efforts initially began in about 2005 or 2006, they did not expect the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular to be published until fall 2010.” The GAO observes, “Although these ongoing efforts may address some of the findings and recommendations from the 2005 and 2006 reports, it is not evident that the Coast Guard utilized the reports or their recommendations to inform the agency’s decision making, as officials could not confirm whether the 2005 and 2006 reports were the catalyst for the agency’s actions. In addition, Coast Guard officials confirmed that the ongoing actions will not address all of the findings and recommendations from the reports. As a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that they believe the ferry security reports can still provide valuable information and they plan to begin evaluating the reports in fall 2010. “ The report also states that the USCG informed the GAO that the results of the 2005 and 2006 studies will not be taken into account in the re-write of Subchapter H.

The report has a similar negative conclusion when it addresses vehicle screening requirements for ferry operators. The USCG has not updated these requirements since 2004, a situation familiar to the maritime security training community. “Despite Coast Guard documents from 2004 stating that a reassessment of the screening requirements should be conducted when the ferry security studies were completed or if the threat were to change—both of which have occurred—as of May 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that they had not taken action to reassess and update the requirements since the 2004 security directive. “

GAO’s recommendations were to #1, review these 2005 and 2006 studies and take appropriate actions to address the findings and recommendations identified in these reports; and #2, “upon review of the reports, ensure that vehicle screening requirements are set at an appropriate level that considers both the risks to and operating requirements of ferry systems, and when warranted, reassess screening requirements for ferries and make changes as appropriate.”

For persons new to MTSA, on pages 8 – 10 there is an excellent set of tables that lays out roles and responsibilities of the many stakeholders involved in maritime security, and the legal and regulatory framework that direct the security actions of vessel and facility operators.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Small Vessel Security Content of GAO-11-140R

A Review of the Small Vessel Security Content of GAO-11-140R Questions for the Record October 22, 2010

In this series on questions posed to the Government Accountability Office, the questions concerning small vessel security addressed the following issues:

• Are transponders a viable solution to the SVS threat?
• How do transponders compare to the “block watch” solution?
• Is it cost-effective to try to track small vessels?

The discussion began with a review of actions in place to mitigate the SV threat, which includes: the development of the Small Vessel Security Strategy, community outreach efforts through the America’s Waterway Watch (AWW) program and Operation Focused Lens, individual port-level vessel tracking efforts with radars and cameras, individual port-scale nuclear detection pilot projects, establishment of security zones in U.S. ports and waterways, escorts of possible targets of waterborne improvised explosive devices, and use of aircraft and other technology by USCG and CBP in international waters.

Concerning the use of transponders, the document states that “ the expansion of vessel tracking to all small vessels—through transponders or other methods—may be of limited utility because of the large number of small vessels, the difficulty identifying threatening actions, the challenges associated with getting resources on scene in time to prevent an attack once it has been identified, and the limitations of certain equipment.” Even if all small vessels are identified and tracked, the problem is determining intent and then initiating response in a timely fashion. The document states that risk-based decision-making is a more feasible approach to mitigating the threat.

The GAO supports a “blended” approach, advocating a risk-based decision-making mitigation approach supported by intelligence-gathering efforts at the port level, such as AWW and Operation Focused Lens. Risk-based decision-making will allow limited resources to be focused an areas of greatest risk.

The document also addresses the seriousness of the SV threat, stating, “The primary consequence of a terrorist incident (as well as other transportation security incidents) arising from the use of a small vessel could be devastating for the U.S. economy if it damaged critical infrastructure or resulted in closure of a port.“

One additional source for intelligence gathering and threat mitigation that is not addressed in the document (because it is not raised in the questions posed by the Senators) is the Area Maritime Security Committee.

§ 103.310 Responsibilities of the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committee.
(a) The AMS Committee shall:
(1) Identify critical port infrastructure and operations;
(2) Identify risks (threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences);
(3) Determine mitigation strategies and implementation methods;
(4) Develop and describe the process to continually evaluate overall port security by considering consequences and vulnerabilities, how they may change over time, and what additional mitigation strategies can be applied; and
(5) Provide advice to, and assist the COTP in, developing the AMS Plan.
(b) The AMS Committee shall also serve as a link for communicating threats and changes in MARSEC Levels, and disseminating appropriate security information to port stakeholders.

The plan that is the result of the collaboration between the USCG and the AMSC is founded on a risk-based assessment that includes a threat assessment that identifies and evaluates each potential threat on the basis of various factors, including capability and intention, and a consequence and vulnerability assessment for each target/scenario combination. Small vessel security threat mitigation becomes an AMSP responsibility because the plan should include measures to prevent the introduction of dangerous substances and devices into designated restricted areas within the port as well as measures to prevent unauthorized access to designated restricted areas within the port. Many ports have considered exercise scenarios in which small vessels have posed big problems that resulted in the introduction of dangerous substances and devices and an alarming time at MARSEC 3.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Great maritime security blog to follow

John Bennett's maritime security blog has great posts on IMO's new maritime security manual and on new developments concerning SSI. Thanks for the heavy lift, John.

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

New Port Security Training Provisions in HR 3619

Below is a comparison between the port security training provisions of the The Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFEPort Act) and the USCG Authorization Act 0f 2011 (HR 3619.) HR 3619 has been passed by Congress and is awaiting the President’s signature.

SAFEPORT Act Provisions (Sec. 113)

This was a wider piece of legislation whose intent was to establish a Port Security Training Program, to enhance the security preparedness of regulated facilities. This Program was supposed to provide validated ( not defined) training to
• multiple port security stakeholders
• at the awareness, performance, management, and planning levels
• addressing many port security topics, including cargo theft and container security
• that supports the many national plans
• is evaluated against clear and consistent performance measures ( no further guidance provided)
• addresses the security requirements contained in facility security plans
• includes education of the neighborhoods surrounding the facilities.

This Act was passed four years ago. There is no Port Security Training Program.

USCG Authorization Act of 2011

Section 821 is Port Security Training and Certification, and it will have a major effect on the training of facility security officers. (It is unclear to me if the framers of this law intended it to refer to persons regulated under 33 CFR 105.205 or 33 CFR 105.210 or both. I am assuming that “facility security officers” refers to 105.205 but that might not be a valid assumption. Persons who don’t work with MTSA on a regular basis can be derailed by the difference between “officer” and “personnel” in this context.) This section repeals Section 113 of the SAFEPort Act.

This section establishes a training program leading to certification for FSO’s. In putting together this training program, DHS must work with affected industry stakeholders (details of collaboration not given), and evaluate existing training programs already in place at terminals, programs already developed by the government, and also factor in the

This program is to provide validated training (not defined)
• at the awareness, performance, management, and planning levels
• utilizes multiple training media and methods
• establishes an on-line certification methodology
• provides for continuing education for FSO’s beyond certification, including a program on shipping hazardous and especially hazardous cargo
• addresses a wide variety of port security topics.

These topics differ slightly from the list in the SAFEPort Act. Included are
• how to develop security plans
• requirements under ISPS for shore leave for mariners
• any other subject matter prescribed by DHS.

The following topics were not addressed under the SAFEPort Act.

1. Programs will be developed for Federal, state, and local officials with security responsibilities at United States seaports (unclear if this also applies to inland waters) to provide them with training about:
• port and shipping operations and MTSA
• dangers and issues connected with the shipments of hazardous and especially hazardous cargoes
• continuing education as deemed necessary

Author’s aside: It is gratifying to find that the University of Findlay is so far ahead of the curve with our DHS-certified training for first responders with 105 facilities in their jurisdictions, AWR 144 Port and Vessel Security for Public Safety and Maritime Personnel, which was approved in 2008 and has been presented in more than 40 locations across the U. S.

2. DHS is directed to work with MARAD and with institutions with maritime expertise and with industry stakeholders with security expertise to develop curriculum and deliver training. The partnership must have appropriate training capacity to ensure that training can be provided in a geographically balanced manner to personnel needing certification or education.

3. Development of curriculum and provision of training will now be eligible activities under homeland security or port security grants. This is a welcome modification of the port security grant program. Development of curriculum was not covered, and entities seeking to fund the expensive development process were often caught in a DHS shuffle. Denied a port security grant, they approached FEMA who declared the activities to be port security and directed them back to the port security grant program.

SUMMARY: While there are some interesting provisions in the training section of this new bill, it is unclear what will keep it from the fate of the training program enacted under the SAFEPort Act. It will take time for these provisions to be incorporated into the port and homeland security grant solicitations, and it will take the will to enforce.

Thursday, July 29, 2010

MTSA 2010

On July 21, 2010 Sen. Rockefeller (D-WV) introduced Senate Bill 3969, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2010. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. This piece of legislation is in the earliest stages of its life and it is anticipated that substantial changes will occur before/if it is passed. All provisions of the bill affect the MTSA community but here are some selections. My comments are in brackets.

SMALL VESSEL SECURITY. The bill requires operators of recreational vessel equipped with propulsion machinery of any kind to carry a certificate, card, or other proof of successful completion of a recreational boating safety course or test that conforms to the National Boating Education Standards as recognized by the United States Coast Guard. There are exemptions for recent purchases, charters, rentals, and persons who have valid U. S. Coast Guard MMD’s. There is a lengthy phase-in for this provision: 3 years after the date of the enactment for operators 18 years or younger, and 7 years after the date of the enactment for all operators.

The America’s Waterway Watch Program is formally established within the USCG, and funded with $3,000,000 annually through 2016. Provisions address immunity for good-faith reporting of suspicious activities, and immunity for response to the report on the part of the authorized officials not entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.

TRANSPORTATION OF ESPECIALLY HAZARDOUS CARGOES. DHS will work with the International Maritime Organization and in consultation with the International Standards Organization and shipping industry stakeholders to develop protocols, procedures, standards, and requirements for receiving, handling, loading, unloading, vessel crewing, and transportation of especially hazardous cargo to promote the safe and secure operation of ports, facilities, and vessels that transport especially hazardous cargo to the United States. An IMO work item concerning this transportation is encouraged.

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INCIDENT MITIGATION PLAN. These plans will establish regional response and recovery protocols to prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, and recover from a transportation security incident consistent with section 202 of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 942) [Post-incident recovery.]

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY INDIVIDUAL. Section 308 states that all U. S. registered vessels five net tons or more or each foreign vessel entering a United States port or a facility on or adjacent to the waterways of the United States, engaged in the commercial transportation of goods or passengers shall designate a U. S. person that is responsible for responding to a transportation security incident involving the vessel while in the United States to notify appropriate emergency response entities and facilitating vessel response activities; and provide notice to the Coast Guard Captain of the Port of the identity of, and contact for such person. [Interesting to see how much of a burden this might be.]

SEAMAN SHORESIDE ACCESS. Section 309 states that each105 facility security plan shall provide a system for seamen assigned to a vessel at that facility, pilots, and representatives of seamen’s welfare and labor organizations, to board and depart the vessel through the facility in a timely manner at no cost to the individual. (Does not affect TWIC.)

RISK BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION. Section 310 states that n carrying out chapter 701 of title 46 (Port Security,) DHS shall develop and utilize a national standard and formula for prioritizing and addressing assessed security risks at United State ports and facilities on or adjacent to the waterways of the United States, such as the Maritime Assessment Strategy Tool that has been tested by the Department of Homeland Security. AMSC’s shall use this standard to regularly evaluate, prioritize, and mitigate each port’s most significant risks. DHS shall utilize the standard when considering departmental resource allocations and grant making decisions. [Will this codify MSRAM?]

MSRAM. Section 311 states that within 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act, DHS shall make the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model tool available, in an unclassified version, on a limited basis to regulated vessels and facilities to conduct true risk assessments of their own facilities and vessels using the same criteria employed by the United States Coast Guard when evaluating a port area, facility, or vessel.

INTEGRATION OF SECURITY PLANS AND SYSTEMS WITH LOCAL PORT AUTHORITIES, STATE HARBOR DIVISIONS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. The owner or operator of a facility shall—‘(1) make a current copy of the vulnerability assessment conducted under subsection (b) of Section 70102 of title 46, United States Code, available to the port authority with jurisdiction of the facility and appropriate State or local law enforcement agencies; an(2) integrate, to the maximum feasible extent, any security system for the facility with compatible systems operated or maintained by the appropriate State, law enforcement agencies, and the Coast Guard.

[Is there a distinction between the 70102 VA and the 105.300 VA?]

WRITTEN AGREEMENTS REQUIRED BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYAND PUBLIC OR PRIVATE MARINE TERMINAL OPERATORS. Section 313 addresses these agreements, and states that at a minimum they will cover the terms and conditions for use of the screening devices, including operations and safety procedures. The agreements will include an indemnification and hold harmless clause to protect the marine terminal operator from liability for injuries or damage to individuals or property caused by DHS.

PORT SECURITY TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION. This section amends 46 USC 701 and addresses comprehensive facility security officer training requirements designed to provide full security training that would lead to certification of such officers.

In establishing the requirements, the Secretary shall work with affected industry stakeholders and evaluate 1) the requirements that the training program shall provide; 2) existing security training programs employed at marine terminal facilities; and 3) existing port security training programs developed by the Federal Government.

The training program shall provide validated training that—

(1) provides training at the awareness, performance, management, and planning levels;

(2) utilizes multiple training mediums and methods;

(3) establishes a validated provisional on-line certification methodology;

(4) addresses port security topics, including—

(A) facility security plans and procedures, including how to develop security plans and security procedure requirements when threat levels are elevated;

(B) facility security force operations and management;

(C) physical security and access control at facilities;

(D) methods of security for preventing and countering cargo theft;

(E) container security;

(F) recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances, and devices;

(G) operation and maintenance of security equipment and systems;

(H) security threats and patterns;

(I) security incident procedures, including procedures for communicating with governmental and nongovernmental emergency response providers; and

(J) evacuation procedures;

(5) is consistent with, and supports implementation of, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Preparedness Guidance, the National Preparedness Goal, the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, and other such national initiatives;

(6) is evaluated against clear and consistent performance measures; and addresses security requirements under facility security plans.

CONTINUING SECURITY TRAINING.—DOT will work with State and local law enforcement agencies and industry stakeholders to develop and certify

the following additional security training requirements for Federal, State, and local officials with security responsibilities at United States seaports:

(1) A program to familiarize them with port and shipping operations, requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and other port

and cargo security programs that educates and trains them with respect to their roles and responsibilities.

(2) A program to familiarize them with dangers and potential issues with respect to shipments of hazardous and especially hazardous cargoes.

(3) A program of continuing education as deemed necessary by DOT.

TRAINING PARTNERS.—In developing and delivering training under the training program and continuing security training, the Secretary, in coordination with the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation, and consistent with section 109 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. 70101), shall—

(1) work with government training facilities, academic institutions, private organizations, employee organizations, and other entities that provide

specialized, state-of-the-art training for governmental and non-governmental emergency responder providers or commercial seaport personnel and management; and

(2) utilize, as appropriate, government training facilities, courses provided by community colleges, public safety academies, State and private universities, and other facilities.

CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, DOT shall ensure that activities surrounding the development of curriculum and the provision of training are eligible to receive grant funds.

GRANT PROGRAM.—DOT shall establish a grant program to provide funds to industry stakeholders to help underwrite their assistance in the development of curriculum and training under this section.

This training program is funded to DOT, $3,000,000 in 2011 and 2012.

[Interesting additions. First of all, does this section use the 33 CFR 101 definitions for facility security officer? On-line training is mentioned. The program is funded. The IMO Model Course is not addressed. MARAD is still in charge. Training for port first responders is addressed. {The University of Findlay has been presenting this training in a DHS-certified format since 2007, all over the U. S.}The subchapter H updates are supposed to address training standards – there is no connection between this bill it its final form and the updates, which have been in the regulatory hopper for years.]

NMSAC – Section 315 refines the membership of NMSAC, ensuring that there is at least one member representing port authorities, facilities, terminals, vessels, maritime labor, academia, state and local government, and maritime industry. AMSC membership is also refined; members are to be composed of individuals who represent the interests of the port industry, terminal operators, port labor organizations, and other users of the port areas.

[Just my opinion but the purpose of the AMSC is the security port area as a whole, and the idea of choosing someone because of the interest that they represent is odd and possibly counterproductive. The phrase “the interests of” indicates to me the interests of that group to the exclusion of everyone else.]

More to come on this bill......