TWIC Enrollment Centers Transitioned from Lockheed Martin to MorphoTrust - Important Payment Information

On June 24, 2013, the Transportation Security Administration posted the following notice on its website:

The TWIC Program has transitioned to UES: All TWIC Enrollment Centers have now been transitioned to the Universal Enrollment Services (UES). For information and appointments please contact the UES Call Center at 1-855 DHS-UES1 (1-855-347-8371) Monday through Friday 8:00AM – 10:00PM Eastern. Effective 6/21/2013 all check and money order payments for TWIC services will be made out to MorphoTrust USA. IMPORTANT: All Enrollment Centers and the Call Center will be closed on July 4, 2013 for Independence Day.

OMB Announcement Concerning TWIC Reader NPRM from Chemical Facility Security News

My colleague Patrick Coyle at Chemical Facility Security News has once more proved how important it is to be a daily reader of his blog at http://chemical-facility-security-news.blogspot.com. He alerted us to the notice that OMB sent out yesterday (03/12/2013) that OMB has completed its mandatory 90-day review of the TWIC reader NPRM.  Below is information from the OMB announcement at reginfo.gov, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=1625-AB21 Title: Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC); Card Reader Requirements  Abstract: The Coast Guard is establishing electronic card reader requirements for maritime facilities and vessels to be used in combination with TSA's Transportation Worker Identification Credential. Congress enacted several statutory requirements within the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 to guide regulations pertaining to TWIC readers, including the need to evaluate TSA's final pilot program report as part of the TWIC reader rulemaking. During the rulemaking process, we will take into account the final pilot data and the various conditions in which TWIC readers may be employed. For example, we will consider the types of vessels and facilities that will use TWIC readers, locations of secure and restricted areas, operational constraints, and need for accessibility. Recordkeeping requirements, amendments to security plans, and the requirement for data exchanges (i.e., Canceled Card List) between TSA and vessel or facility owners/operators will also be addressed in this rulemaking.  Agency: Department of Homeland Security(DHS)  Priority: Other Significant  RIN Status: Previously published in the Unified Agenda Agenda Stage of Rulemaking: Proposed Rule Stage  Major: No  Unfunded Mandates: No  Overall Description of Deadline: The final rule is required 2 years after the commencement of the pilot program.

Statement of Need: The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 explicitly required the issuance of a biometric transportation security card to all U.S. merchant mariners and to workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. On May 22, 2006, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to carry out this statute, proposing a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program where TSA conducts security threat assessments and issues identification credentials, while the Coast Guard requires integration of the TWIC into the access control systems of vessels, facilities, and Outer Continental Shelf facilities. Based on comments received during the public comment period, TSA and the Coast Guard split the TWIC rule. The final TWIC rule, published in January of 2007, addressed the issuance of the TWIC and use of the TWIC as a visual identification credential at access control points. The ANPRM, published in March of 2009, proposed a risk-based approach to TWIC reader requirements and included proposals to classify MTSA-regulated vessels and facilities into one of three risk groups, based on specific factors related to TSI consequence, and apply TWIC reader requirements for vessels and facilities in conjunction with their relative risk-group placement. This rulemaking is necessary to comply with the SAFE Port Act and to complete the implementation of the TWIC Program in our ports. By requiring electronic card readers at vessels and facilities, the Coast Guard will further enhance port security and improve access control measures.

Summary of the Legal Basis: The statutory authorities for the Coast Guard to prescribe, change, revise, or amend these regulations are provided under 33 U.S.C. 1226, 1231; 46 U.S.C. chapter 701; 50 U.S.C. 191, 192; Executive Order 12656, 3 CFR 1988 Comp., p. 585; 33 CFR 1.05-1, 6.04-11, 6.14, 6.16, and 6.19; Department of Homeland Security Delegation No. 0170.1.

Alternatives: The implementation of TWIC reader requirements is mandated by the SAFE Port Act. The Coast Guard is currently considering several regulatory alternatives regarding how to implement the TWIC reader requirements. These alternatives will be further explored in the NPRM.

Anticipated Costs and Benefits: The main cost drivers of this proposal are the acquisition and installation of TWIC readers and the maintenance of the affected entity's TWIC reader system. Costs, which we would distribute over a phased-in implementation period, consist predominantly of the costs to purchase, install, and integrate approved TWIC readers to their current physical access control system. Recurring annual costs will be driven by costs associated with canceled card list updates, opportunity cost associated with delays and replacement of TWICs that cannot be read, and maintenance of the affected entity's TWIC reader system. At this time, we are still developing our estimates for the impacts of this proposed rule. The benefits of the rulemaking include the enhancement of the security of vessel ports and other facilities by ensuring that only individuals who hold valid TWICs are granted unescorted access to secure areas at those locations. It will also implement the 2002 MTSA transportation security card requirements, thereby ensuring compliance with those statutes.

Risks: USCG used risk-based decision-making to develop this proposed rule.

TWIC Renewal

Yesterday I began the steps to perform the 5-year renewal of my TWIC. I have the following to report:

Positives:

1. Both TSA HelpDesk personnel that I spoke with were extremely courteous, apologetic about the wait, and seemed to be informed about the process.

2.  I received email notification about the transaction within minutes of its completion.

Negatives:

1.  I was unable to use the website to pre-enroll, as directed by the TSA TWIC FAQs. When I entered my personal information, I was moved onto a screen that informed me that I already have a TWIC and needed to enter a UserID and password. I could not recall whatever it was that I had selected 5 years ago.  I attempted to use both the “forgot UserID” function and the “forgot password” function. Clicking on these links led to a screen in which I was required to enter the answer to two challenge questions. The screen would not accept my answers, although I know they were correct.  I tried mis-spelling combinations and even that was unsuccessful. I also got an error message once as I was moving between screens. There is no moving forward from the challenge question screen so I was stuck. The option to use the website to pre-enroll was now closed to me.

2.  I then called the HelpDesk and experienced a combined wait on hold of one hour.  When an agent came on the line, she advised me that you cannot enroll for a 5-year renewal via the website.  She stated, “We need to help you with that.”  She asked me if I had ever contacted the HelpDesk before. I had, and she pulled up a case number and my card information. She said I would need to remember the case number as she was going to transfer me to another agent for payment and he would need the number.  There was a second lengthy wait and another agent came on the line and to take my ID and payment information.  This agent stated that the only way to renew the card for 5 years was to walk into an enrollment center, but that he could renew my TWIC for 3 years under the EED program. I did opt for the 3 year EED although I disagree with its basic premise because it excludes the background checks. Later I asked the agent for clarification about the procedure for renewing for 5-years and he stated that you can pre-enroll online but it is just as quick to walk into the enrollment center. I told him about the problems I was having with the website.  He was apologetic but stated that the website was a different branch of the program. So I basically got two answers as to whether one can use the website for the 5-year renewal: “yes” and “no”.

3. It appears to me from my experience that you cannot use the HelpDesk for the 5-year renewal, and that the website is experiencing problems so you cannot pre-enroll via the website. This leaves open the question: is possible that TSA is funneling many renewal requests into the EED option? This would greatly speed up and streamline  the renewal process but it defeats the purpose of the card.  We need at least an every-five-year snapshot of the backgrounds of the people who are being granted unescorted access to the secure areas of regulated facilities and vessels.

Reduction in TWIC fee effective 03/19/2012

I check the TSA TWIC website (http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/twic/index.shtm) on a regular basis. Sometime in the last several days, the following was posted:

Effective March 19, 2012, the fee charged by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for electronically processing fingerprint-based criminal history records information (CHRI) will decrease from $17.25 to $14.50 - a reduction of $2.75. As a result, the enrollment fee for the TWIC program will reduce from $132.50 to $129.75 (effective March 19, 2012). Additional information is provided in the related Federal Register Notice, dated December 20, 2011, located at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-20/pdf/2011-32544.pdf. Click here to read questions and answers related to this issue.

New GAO Report on TSA Credentialing Program

Today (December 8, 2011) the Government Accountability Office issued GAO 12-60, Transportation Security: Actions Needed to Address Limitations in TSA’s Transportation Worker Security Threat Assessments and Growing Workload. The report can be found at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-60.

What prompted the report: In summary, “In response to a mandate in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, GAO examined TSA credentialing programs to identify

(1) the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal government entities related to TSA’s transportation worker credentialing programs and how they compare, and

(2) any key challenges TSA faced in ensuring the effectiveness of its credentialing programs.

GAO reviewed program documentation, such as program processes, and conducted structured interviews with selected airports, port authorities, and state agencies. GAO selected nonfederal government entities based on volume of passengers, truckers, and cargo…Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) manages several credentialing programs, which include background checking (known as Security Threat Assessments) and issuing credentials to transportation workers requiring unescorted access to the nation’s transportation facilities. The number of TSA programs and their potential for redundancy with state and local government programs has raised questions about these credentialing programs.

GAO Recommendations: GAO recommends that (1) TSA and the FBI conduct a joint risk assessment of TSA’s access to criminal history records, (2) TSA assess costs and benefits of using state-provided criminal history information, and (3) TSA develop a workforce staffing plan to address its growing Adjudication Center workload. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

Within the report itself, the following comments/statements stood out to us, especially the discussion of the advantages of having a local/separate credentialing program :

Local/separate credentialing programs:

• Port authorities or state agencies at 11 of the 17 maritime ports we contacted—including 4 of the top 10 largest maritime ports—had implemented additional credentialing requirements to those of the TWIC program.28Of these 11 maritime ports, 10 required employer sponsorship in addition to a valid TWIC, 3 required applicants to undergo additional criminal history record checks, and 10 issued a local port identification credential in addition to the TWIC which was necessary for gaining unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA regulated port facilities.

• Six of 11 port authorities reported plans to revise or do away with their credentialing programs once the Coast Guard issues its final reader rule for the TWIC program and the ports deploy readers for electronically verifying TWICs.

• Governing officials from 10 of 11 ports with additional programs reported that their local enrollment and identification served as a mechanism for establishing a valid business reason for an individual to access the secure or restricted areas of the port facility, in accordance with TSA and Coast Guard requirements.

• Officials from two ports reported that they required additional scrutiny of all TWIC holders who reported receiving their TWIC through the TWIC waiver process.

• The TWIC waivers enabled applicants with certain interim disqualifying criminal offenses, such as murder or unlawful weapons possession, to obtain a TWIC. For example, the Port of Miami, Port Everglades, and the Alabama State Port Authority provided us with a sample of individuals who had either been denied local credentials or had local credentials revoked. We provided TSA 30 of these names to confirm that they had valid TWICs. In 11 of the 30 cases, TSA adjudicators identified disqualifying criminal offenses but the applicants were ultimately approved for a TWIC through the redress process (waiver or appeals). Among those offenses committed by these 11 individuals were murder, attempted murder, carjacking and armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm.

In addition, officials from three ports reported criminal history record checks enabled them to target local risks facing their ports which are not addressed under TSA regulations for the TWIC program. For example, officials from the Port of Miami and the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor told us that, while they recognized the threats posed by terrorism, crime was a major concern for their ports, particularly narcotics.

• Officials reported that by screening applicant criminal history records against certain additional disqualifying offenses to those of TWIC, such as theft, they were able to deny access to a population of felons they perceived as longstanding criminal risks facing the port who might be granted a TWIC. These governing entities reported denying credentials to applicants who had been granted TWICs. For example, between January 2009 and May 2011, the Port of Miami reported it had denied credentials to 101 applicants, including 52 valid TWIC holders. Port Everglades also reported it had denied credentials to applicants, including those with valid TWICs. Among those denied, was an individual convicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in 2007, yet issued a TWIC in 2010. According to these Port Everglades documents, this individual was arrested several times for other offenses, such as unlawful possession of a firearm, including a short-barrel shotgun and machine gun, and other narcotics offenses.

• Further, the three ports reported that they had mechanisms in place for conducting recurring criminal history checks on an ongoing basis through an automated “rap back” program. 40 Specifically, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, which conducts background checks for longshoremen at the Port of New York/New Jersey, has a mechanism in place that allows it to receive automated notifications on arrests and warrants. According to officials at the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, these notifications have led to the suspension and revocation of numerous longshoremen credentials. Examples from local credentialing programs of those who had TWICs but were denied by selected governing port authorities after local disqualifying criminal offenses were committed include the following: An individual issued a TWIC in 2008, who was subsequently convicted of robbery and grand theft in 2010. The individual’s local credential was revoked in December 2010. TSA identified this individual as having a valid TWIC as of July 2011.

• At 9 of the 11 ports with additional programs, officials reported that having a local credential that could be verified by an existing access control system provided them the capability to better verify the card presented, while more quickly and effectively canceling access control to workers who violate security procedures. For example, a Florida port reported it revoked the local identification card of an individual because it had been notified by state law enforcement of the arrest of the cardholder for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Officials noted that their programs were particularly important in verifying TWIC cardholders because the Coast Guard had yet to issue a final rule laying out requirements for electronic verification of TWICs.

• Fees: Some of the 11 ports with separate credentialing programs imposed additional costs. The costs were largely associated with administering the credentialing program. For the ports that charged a fee, the applicants were required to pay these fees in addition to their credentialing costs already incurred in obtaining their TWIC.41 We found that the nonfederal governing entities were charging applicant fees at 3 of 11 ports, ranging from $20 to $94.20. For these ports, applicant fees were generally covering costs for administering state and national FBI criminal history record checks. We found the fees among these ports differed based on the varying costs charged by governing entities for conducting the criminal history checks and whether an FBI criminal history record check was also required.

• The state and local credentialing programs we reviewed complement, rather than duplicate, TSA’s credentialing programs.

TSA’s Internal Problems

• TSA reported administering 17 transportation security related credentialing programs covering a population of approximately 15 million transportation workers such as those accessing airports and maritime ports, as well as truckers seeking a hazardous materials endorsement to a commercial driver’s license.

• The TSA Adjudication Center relies on contractors for adjudicating applicant cases, and contractor turnover has affected the agency’s ability to meet its growing workload. (Note, we have heard that Lockheed Martin subcontracted to Kelly Services.)

• Specifically, the level of access through which TSA receives criminal history record information through the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index is the level of access accorded for noncriminal justice purposes. According to TSA, this level of access only allows a limited view of criminal history record information as opposed to a more expanded level of access accorded criminal justice agencies… Thus, TSA reports that its visibility to applicant criminal history records is often incomplete because the provided information excludes details regarding dispositions, sentencing, release dates, and probation or parole violations, among others. TSA reported that this lack of visibility to additional criminal history record information via the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index system hinders its ability to fulfill its homeland security mission and conduct Security Threat Assessments with more detailed and complete information for its credentialing programs….According to a 2006 Department of Justice report while the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index is comprehensive in its coverage of nationwide arrest records for serious offenses, it is still missing final disposition information for approximately 50 percent of its records.

• According to TSA records, the agency has met with officials from states that directly provided criminal history records information to discuss the technical steps that would be necessary for them to send TSA criminal history information in a manner that TSA may effectively use. TSA reported it has sought possible solutions to receive data directly from other states in an automated solution. However, the agency has faced obstacles because states have varying data systems and legal and practical constraints requiring TSA to develop unique solutions for obtaining data from a state. As a result, TSA reported it was pursuing a common technical solution for obtaining state criminal information through the agency’s TTAC Infrastructure Modernization Program. Nonetheless, TSA’s schedule for the modernization program indicates that it will not be completed until late 2015 and TSA has yet to determine how the program would integrate existing streams of criminal history provided by states. Moreover, TSA reported that future efforts to obtain additional state criminal information may require TSA to pay additional fees to states and the cost of these fees may need to be funded by increasing applicant fees for TSA credentialing programs.

• The TTAC Adjudication Center has been challenged to meet its workload requirements since it began conducting operations in 2005. According to the TTAC Adjudication Center’s current staffing plan, last released in February 2011, insufficient federal staff has hampered the Adjudication Center’s ability to meet its workload requirements and ensure necessary oversight of the credential decision-making process. Among other things, the plan states that staffing limitations had left the center unable to perform quality assurance and oversight responsibilities, conduct necessary redress activities, and issue “Initial Determinations of Threat Assessments” in a timely manner.

• According to a senior TTAC Adjudication Center official, the Adjudication Center has faced recurring challenges in meeting its workload since it began operations—largely related to TSA’s reliance on contractor staff as its primary adjudicator workforce. As of July 2011, 72 percent (38 of 53) of Adjudication Center staff were contractors.67 The challenge is that TSA has used three different contractors since establishing the adjudication center in 2005, and on each occasion the turnovers have led to backlogs as the TTAC adjudication center hired and trained new staff.68According to the official, federal staff must train each new set of contractors, and it has taken about 8 to 10 months for new contractors to become proficient so they may assume their full responsibilities. Because the Adjudication Center relies on contract staff to adjudicate the majority of its caseload, the contractor turnover has required the federal staff to take on additional work during these periods. According to the Adjudication Center official, federal staff have needed to regularly work overtime over the past five years to meet workload requirements.

• TSA awarded a new adjudication center contract in February 2010 that runs through January 2015. This contract includes a 1-year base period with four, 1-year options. Under this contract, based on the performance of the contractor, TSA may select another contractor within the next 5 years which could result in a change in its adjudicator workforce—and pose risks to the Adjudication Center’s sustainability and performance in meeting mission requirements. 72 Furthermore, TSA anticipates expanding the Adjudication Center caseload considerably for additional credentialing programs, which may further exacerbate these challenges.