DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has Issued a New Request for Comment, Assessing the Risk-Mitigation Value of TWIC® at Maritime Facilities.

On Feb. 07, 2019, Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new request for comment, Assessing the Risk-Mitigation Value of TWIC® at Maritime Facilities.  This notice is located in the Federal Register at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-02-07/pdf/2019-01377.pdf .

Please note that this notice requests comments on two items: number one, how effective the TWIC program is at enhancing security and reducing security risks for regulated maritime facilities and vessels, and number two, specific issues concerning an annual information collection about assessing the risk mitigation value of TWIC® at maritime facilities.

From the notice:

By law, the Secretary of Homeland Security is required to commission an assessment of how effective the transportation security card program is at enhancing security and reducing security risks for regulated maritime facilities and vessels. Through the transportation security card program, the Department issues the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC®). Legislation passed August 2, 2018 restricts the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) from implementing any rule requiring the use of biometric readers for TWIC® until after submission to Congress of the results of this effectiveness assessment.

The Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC), a federally funded research and development center operated by the RAND Corporation, will collect information from those involved in maritime security on behalf of the DHS S&T Research and Development Partnerships (RDP) Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) Program Management Office. HSOAC will visit regulated maritime facilities and terminals and conduct interviews using a semi-structured interview method to collect information. HSOAC will analyze this information and use it to produce a public report with its research findings.

DATES: Comments are encouraged and accepted until April 8, 2019.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS–2018–0052, at:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Please follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Mail and hand delivery or commercial delivery: Science and Technology Directorate, ATTN: Chief Information Office—Mary Cantey, 245 Murray Drive, Mail Stop 0202, Washington, DC 20528.

Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number DHS–2018–0052.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Secretary of Homeland Security, according to Public Law 114–278, is required to commission an assessment of how effective the transportation security card program is at enhancing security and reducing security risks for regulated maritime facilities and vessels. Through the transportation security card program, the Department issues the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC®). In addition, Public Law 115–230 restricts the USCG from implementing any rule requiring the use of biometric readers for TWIC® until submitting the results of this assessment to Congress. DHS, in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., provides the general public and Federal agencies with an opportunity to comment on proposed, revised, and continuing collections of information. DHS is soliciting comments on the proposed information collection request (ICR) that is described below. DHS is especially interested in public comment addressing the following issues: (1) Is this collection necessary to the proper functions of the Department; (2) will this information be processed and used in a timely manner; (3) is the estimate of burden accurate; (4) how might the Department enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (5) how might the Department minimize the burden of this collection on the respondents, including through the use of information technology? Please note that written comments received in response to this notice will be considered public records.

Title of Collection: Assessing the Risk Mitigation Value of TWIC® at Maritime Facilities.

Type of Review: New.

Affected Public: Port security subject matter experts such as Port Authority Security Managers, Facility Security Managers, Industry Security Managers, and local law enforcement; Labor, Other Industry Operation and Technology Managers.

Frequency of Collection: Once, Annually.

Average Burden per Response: 60 minutes.

Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 400.

Total Annual Burden Hours: 400.

Discussion: There is an effective and an ineffective way to comment on a regulation. From “Tips for Submitting Effective Comments”, found at https://www.regulations.gov/docs/Tips_For_Submitting_Effective_Comments.pdf:

·         "Read and understand the regulatory document you are commenting on
·         Feel free to reach out to the agency with questions
·         Be concise but support your claims
·         Base your justification on sound reasoning, scientific evidence, and/or how you will be impacted
·         Address trade-offs and opposing views in your comment
·         There is no minimum or maximum length for an effective comment
·         The comment process is not a vote – one well supported comment is often more influential than a thousand form letters."

Comments submitted to address the first issue need to mention how the program does or does not enhance security and reduce security risks for regulated maritime facilities and vessels. That you are personally inconvenienced during the enrollment process or that the cards are not accepted at airports probably does not address the question of risk reduction in the maritime environment. A comment that is submitted without the word “risk” or “security” in it seems to me to be flawed at the onset. DHS is required to consider these comments so this is one more chance for us to get our hands on the TWIC program and influence its path. Let’s make sure we don’t waste this opportunity.

I am still gathering information on the details of number two, the information collection. I want to know how DHS arrived at the figure of 400 persons who will submit information, and that the collection will take one hour. Until I know these details, I can’t sensibly comment on the second issue.

Troubling DHS Analysis of an Unexpected Closure of the Poe Lock and Its Impact

The Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA-NISAC),  has released “The Perils of Efficiency: An Analysis of an Unexpected Closure of the Poe Lock and Its Impact.”  We wish to thank the Principal Investigator Craig S. Gordon, PhD and Supporting Investigator Marilee Orr for this disturbing but truly important document, and for the editors of Seaway Review and the Lake Carriers Association for making the report easily accessible. Below is a summary, derived from the report, which can be found at http://www.lcaships.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/OCIA-The-Perils-of-Efficiency-An-Analysis-of-an-Unexpected-Closure-of-the-Poe-Lock-and-Its-Impact1.pdf. 

"The Soo Locks, which are owned and operated by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), consists of four lock.The two primary locks in operation are the Poe Lock, rebuilt in 1968, and the MacArthur Lock, constructed in 1943.The Lakers carrying iron ore use the Poe Lock almost exclusively because the MacArthur Lock is too small to accommodate the larger Lakers; almost 70 percent of the U.S. Laker capacity on the Great Lakes is Poe-restricted, meaning that the Lakers can use only the Poe Lock. Lakers small enough to lock through the MacArthur Lock are referred, herein, as MacArthur-sized. The dependency on the Poe Locks to move the preponderance of the commodities, particularly iron ore, led USACE to call the Poe Lock “the Achilles’ heel of the Great Lakes Navigation System. There is currently no redundancy for the Poe Lock.”34 This lock is the weak link in Great Lakes commerce.

The scenario closure used in the analysis lasts from March 25– September 25. Overall, about 78 percent of the domestic iron ore capacity is expected to shutter for the duration of the scenario. Limestone deliveries could continue if only the Poe Lock closed. Far less limestone is required to move upstream, as the iron ore-to-limestone ratio is about 9:1.  Further, limestone is far less dense than iron ore and there are more options to deliver limestone to the pelletizing plant.

An extended closure of the Poe Lock, which OCIA-NISAC assumes to be 6-months, would be extremely detrimental to the North American automotive industry including Canada and Mexico. Almost all North American automobile production would cease, and, in addition to the automotive industry, other industries that depend on steel including farm, mining, and construction equipment manufacturing, railroad locomotive and railcar production, and appliances.

According to industry experts, short-term disruptions of a single steel mill can cause disruptions throughout the North American supply chain. Firms must scramble to find alternative suppliers and to begin managing the process, part-by-part, to extend production times for at least some of their lines. Eventually, keeping the system going becomes impossible and lines shut down due to the lack of a single component. It could take more than 2 months to resupply the supply chain with enough steel-based product to restart production from the loss of a single steel mill. Lead times for many automotive parts are typically 8 – 14 weeks. However, regarding the current scenario, one industry expert said, "it's all done if all of the steel mills shut down."

A 6-month closure, from about March 25 to September 25 does not mean that steel production could begin shortly thereafter. First, blast furnaces, which presumably have been hot idled or kept warm during the closure, would have to be re-inspected. Extended hot idling can damage or destroy a blast furnace, incurring lengthy repairs times and costs well in excess of $100 million each, though processes have improved that could mitigate this risk. A significant problem with hot-idling a blast furnace is the cooling water. Hot idling a blast furnace during the winter may lead to the freezing of the cooling water and damage to the blast furnace. Blast furnaces generally operate continuously for about 15 years between significant maintenance periods. If a blast furnace is not going to be operated, it must be kept warm by keeping coking coal heated, but not adding in iron ore, limestone and enriched oxygen that make steel. Hot idling, the term to denote this process of keeping the furnace warm is usually not done for periods longer than a few weeks (see Platts, “Platts Steel Glossary,” at

www.steelbb.com/steelglossary/#term_206, accessed January 17, 2015). Anything longer than a few weeks is considered, herein, to be an extended period.

More problematic than re-starting the blast furnace is restarting the coke batteries. Coke batteries concentrate the carbon from coal to make coke, which is an essential ingredient in steelmaking. Industry executives reported that the coke battery must be operated continuously or hot-idled properly to prevent damage. The coke battery is far more likely than the blast furnace to become damaged in this unanticipated outage scenario. OCIA-NISAC analysts believe that the steel mills will not re-commence mill operations until about mid-December, in order to secure sufficient inventory of iron ore to last through the normal winter closure of the Soo Locks. Automotive parts manufacturers could then begin operations in mid-January, but the first cars are not likely to come off production lines until early April. 

The scenario closure would have catastrophic impacts on the regional and National economy. Economic modeling based on the assumptions described in the preceding section shows that approximately $1.1 trillion in economic output, as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and over 10.9 million jobs would be lost in the first year following the disruption. The impacts described here are more severe than those predicted in prior studies because this analysis took a comprehensive view of the supply chain and its relationship to the National economy.

A 6-month closure of the Poe Lock, at the start of the navigation season, would be expected to halt all automobile production and the sales of cars manufactured in North America completely for almost 10 months, from about June 1 to April 1. That is, no automobiles would be produced in North America. By comparison, during the 2009 recession, two of the three major automotive companies required bailouts from the United States Government when annualized sales of new automobiles had dropped from the typical 16–18 million units to about 9 million units.

At the National level, the model predicts that the Poe Lock closure scenario would add 5.8 percentage points to the unemployment rate, currently at 5.5 percent. This would bring the National unemployment rate under the closure scenario to 11.3 percent. This would exceed the highest level of National unemployment recorded during the 2008-2009 recession, which peaked at 10.0 percent in October 2009. Under the Poe Lock closure scenario, exceptionally high rates of unemployment occur along the Great Lakes and south. Unemployment rates in Indiana and Michigan would reach or exceed 22 percent and all of the Great Lakes States, except for Minnesota and New York, have unemployment rates that would exceed 10 percent.

A recession brought about by an unexpected closure of the Poe Lock would be categorically different from historical recessions. Recessions are usually caused by falling aggregate demand, credit contractions, or oil supply shocks, for which government fiscal or monetary policy can mitigate the length or severity of the recession. A supply shock as contemplated herein may be unprecedented. The closest example may be recession following the 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo. In that case, however, oil was available in the United States, but not in sufficient supply to meet demand. The dust bowl in the 1930s resulted in a lack of arable land in the Midwest, which led to the largest population migration in the United States.138 In the Poe Lock closure scenario, there is no plan, policy, or remedy that could restart automobile production. Government policy would be generally limited to transfer payments to those individuals directly impacted by the event.

Moving iron ore from the mines to the mills is not a viable mitigation; as one industry executive put it, “it's not even in the realm of the possible; it's just not going to happen.” Even if the steel mills could accept iron ore from rail transportation, congested rail lines and the lack of equipment would make the use of rail impractical. For 160 years, the steel mills along the Great Lakes have received their iron ore via Lake Carrier; the mills are designed to receive iron ore by water and there is logistically no way to receive iron ore by rail. The Great Lakes steel mills are built with the iron ore inventory facing the water and the rail lines on the other side of the mills inland for truck or rail shipment of steel out.

There are not enough trucks, or drivers, in the Nation to move the iron ore from the mines to the mills. Each One Thousand Footer Lake Carrier carries approximately 70,000 tons of iron ore, which is equivalent to about 3,000 trucks. The mills use the 70,000 tons about every five days, which means that 600 trucks per day--1 truck every 2.4 minutes--would have to enter a steel mill, drop its load and leave. To bring trucks to 7 mills would mean that, for every point on the Interstate Highway System between Minnesota and Indiana, there would be a truck loaded with iron ore passing every 20 seconds on one side of the road and one truck returning empty on the other side of the road. The Interstate Highway System would have to be shut down to all traffic except for the iron ore trucks and no road maintenance could occur. Finally, OCIA-NISAC estimates that the cost of moving iron ore by truck is approximately four times the value of the iron ore itself and would likely be cost-prohibitive in addition to impractical.

In terms of an impact to the North American economy, it is hard to conceive of a single asset more consequential than the Poe Lock. As outlined in the report, 10.9 million jobs in the United States, and possibly upwards of 13 million jobs in North America, are likely dependent on the functioning of the Poe Lock. An unprecedented supply shock could affect North America if the closure scenario were to occur. The United States has historical knowledge of how to respond to shocks caused by financial crises, oil prices or availability, or falling aggregate demand. There is no similar guide for responding to a supply shock that incapacitates a large set of industries.

As documented in this report, the iron mining - integrated steel production - manufacturing, particularly automobile manufacturing, supply chain, is not only consequential, but potentially one of the least resilient supply chain in North America. The relationship between the steel mills and the auto assembly plants is complex. There is a different steel coil for just about every part of an automobile made with steel, and collectively, there are reportedly some 1500 different recipes of steel for the automotive industry. Without the steady stream of iron ore coming from Lake Superior through the Poe Lock, many or all of these 1500 different steel recipes cannot be made. The inability to make just one recipe could stop production of a particular automobile; the inability to make a couple of recipes could stop production for a particular automotive company; and the inability to make a few recipes could stop production of all North American automotive production."

GAO Issues Report: Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy

On November 19, 2013, the Government Accountability Office issued GAO Report 14-32, Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy.  This report is of particular interest to us here at the University of Findlay because our course Small Vessel Security for Rural Communities was recently certified by DHS as AWR 311. The report can be found at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-32. Below are highlights from the report.

From the highlights:

Why GAO did this study: The Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million small vessels operating in the United States in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and largely anonymous. Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit activities. DHS issued its SVSS in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide actions to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. Given the importance of small vessel security, GAO was asked to review DHS’s efforts in developing and implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan.

  

This report examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. GAO analyzed DHS documents; interviewed DHS officials; and visited two ports selected on the basis of the volume of small vessel traffic and security initiatives in place, among other things. While the results of the port visits cannot be generalized across all ports, they provided insights on small vessel security issues and operations.

What GAO found: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components—such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—have started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) Implementation Plan. “Small vessels” are characterized as any watercraft—regardless of method of propulsion—less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. DHS component officials GAO met with identified examples of key initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small vessel security, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign locations and another to assist the Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. Although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and update the plan, DHS has not determined the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders—such as the Department of Defense—are making in completing the action items and has no current plans to do so. DHS officials stated that this is due, in part, to budget constraints that make this a low priority. DHS officials stated that updating the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable, and doing so is particularly important since more than one component could be responsible for action items in the plan. Accordingly, by systematically gathering information from its components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing the action items in the plan, DHS could help prioritize initiatives given constrained budgets and better identify successes and lessons learned, among other things.

What GAO recommends: GAO recommends that DHS regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

From the main body of the report:

DHS officials we spoke with stated that there is no plan to update the SVSS Implementation Plan because it is not a priority, given budget constraints, and it is too early to measure the effectiveness of action items in the plan. According to a senior DHS Policy official, although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS should assess and update the plan annually, given these constraints, an annual review is too frequent. The senior DHS official added that per the Secretary of Homeland Security’s direction, DHS components are focusing on maintaining their ongoing operations under constrained budgets, and so efforts to update the SVSS Implementation Plan are not currently a priority…Coast Guard officials added that America’s Waterway Watch—a program highlighted in the SVSS Implementation Plan that provides outreach to the public, including the small vessel community, on awareness of threats and how to report suspicious activity—may not receive funding in DHS’s fiscal year 2014 appropriation…

DHS officials also stated that because the SVSS Implementation Plan was issued in early 2011, it is too early to expect a majority of the action items to be completed or, especially for the long-term action items, to have been implemented. These officials stated that accomplishing the SVSS’s goals and objectives through implementation of the many action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan will require a significant investment of time and resources, along with buy-in from state and local maritime security stakeholders. Accordingly, it could take years to fully implement some of the action items and determine whether they are effective…

Although it may be too early to measure the effectiveness of some action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, updating the progress made in addressing the action items could help DHS and its components prioritize their efforts given constrained budgets; better identify successes and lessons learned; and enhance collaboration with federal, state, and local stakeholders regarding small vessel security issues. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that, because of risk, the unpredictability of budgets, policy changes, and administrative priorities, the plan must be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains current and accurate. By engaging in this review process, the plan states that it is intended to be a living document that provides a strategic overview of participating agencies’ implementation of the SVSS. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce management’s directives.

Conclusions: Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the United States, DHS issued its SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. DHS component agencies have completed some initiatives and have other initiatives under way to address the risk of a small vessel attack, but DHS is not gathering information on the progress its components or relevant stakeholders are making to address action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan and has no plans to do so. The SVSS Implementation Plan, by design, is to be revised to accommodate new information about threats, technologies, requirements, and lessons learned as action items are implemented, but DHS has not updated the plan since it was issued in 2011. Given that internal controls call for federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce management’s directives, DHS could better prioritize initiatives and identify successes if it was to regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making to address the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. This information could be particularly useful to DHS components that may be operating under more constrained budgets than when the plan was first issued.

Recommendation for Executive Action: To improve DHS’s ability to monitor progress, prioritize action items, and identify successes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security systematically gather information from the department’s components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan.

New Information on Update to Subchapter H

Once again I need to thank Patrick Coyle and his excellent blog Chemical Facility Security News (http://chemical-facility-security-news.blogspot.com) for drawing attention to the fact that DHS has published the Fall 2012 Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=DHS-2012-0079. The documents on this site are dated 12/24/2012. Among many items of interest is the information below about the update to Subchapter H. The Coast Guard is proposing to publish the NPRM during April 2013.

Title: Updates to Maritime Security

Abstract: The Coast Guard proposes certain additions, changes, and amendments to 33 CFR, subchapter H. Subchapter H is comprised of parts 101 through 106. Subchapter H implements the major provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. This rulemaking is the first major revision to subchapter H. The proposed changes would further the goals of domestic compliance and international cooperation by incorporating requirements from legislation implemented since the original publication of these regulations, such as the SAFE Port Act, and including international standards such as STCW security training. This rulemaking has international interest because of the close relationship between subchapter H and the International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS).

Priority: Economically Significant

Agenda Stage of Rulemaking: Proposed Rule

Major: Undetermined

Unfunded Mandates: No

Regulatory Plan:

Statement of Need: This rulemaking is needed to incorporate Coast Guard Policy Advisory Council (PAC) decisions on the interpretation of regulations, guidance provided in response to questions to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) hotline, and to implement various requirements found in the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. In addition, this rulemaking is needed to incorporate recommendations from the Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory Committee. It also incorporates various U.S. Maritime Administration and International Maritime Organization voluntary consensus standards related to maritime security training.

Legal Basis: The fundamental legal basis for subchapter H remains the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 as amended by the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010.

Alternatives: The Coast Guard is currently evaluating a number of alternatives based on applicability and risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence). However, an overall update to make necessary changes to subchapter H and address improvements resulting from our experience since 2003 is prudent.

Costs and Benefits: The Coast Guard is currently estimating the costs associated with this rulemaking. The benefit from these provisions is compliance with mandates and harmonization with international standards. This rulemaking expands and improves competencies associated with Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the United States' security, safety, economy, or environment. The proposed rule would improve MDA through training, exercise, and security plan enhancements.

Risks: With this rulemaking, the Coast Guard seeks to maintain the risk reduction goals established with the promulgation of the original MTSA regulations by incorporating provisions related to more recent legislation and warranted by our experience with subchapter H since 2003.

Timetable:

Action Date, NPRM 04/00/2013

International Impacts: This regulatory action will be likely to have international trade and investment effects, or otherwise be of international interest.

_____________________________________________________________________

What may have changed from the last time the USCG described this NPRM? In January 2012, the USCG used this wording in describing this NPRM: “Among other things, these regulations require owners or operators of vessels and port facilities to develop security plans. Since promulgation of the MTSA regulations, the Coast Guard has granted exemptions from MTSA provisions on an ad hoc, individual basis. Through this rule, the Coast Guard would formalize several categories of exemptions, which, in turn, will reduce the burden associated with the current ad hoc waiver process.” The NPRM would “ clarify MTSA requirements in response to requests for interpretation and guidance; formalize exemptions from certain MTSA provisions, which would provide an annual savings of $125,000 to society.”  ( DHS’ Retrospective Review of Existing Regulations –Progress Report,

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2011-0015-0068).  

It is not clear to me what the Coast Guard envisioned by “categories of exemptions,”  or if these categories will be addressed through adoption of policy guidance from PAC’s and NVIC’s. Is this a substantive change between two drafts, or just another way of describing the same thing? I hope to see language about exemptions in the NPRM. Those of us who have spent considerable time drafting security measures at MARSEC 1, 2, and 3 to defend piles of commodities that “are not now and have never been regulated” will be glad to see system-wide consistency.

And the Coast Guard has advised the MTSA community in another forum that the current FSO training initiative will be addressed in a separate NPRM that will probably not be issued until fall 2013. It is unclear what incorporation of “voluntary consensus standards” could mean, apart from changing “voluntary” to “mandatory.”  This could generate some very interesting scenarios as related to 33 CFR 105.215 and .210 training.

Maritime Security Content of GAO Report On DHS Progress Since 9/11

On Wednesday September 7, 2011, the Government Accountability Office released GAO Report 11-881, “Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.” Since DHS’ inception in 2003, the GAO has issued over 1,000 products about the agency. Since 2003, “DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. “ This particular report addresses DHS’s progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts.

GAO divided DHS’ homeland security responsibilities into ten functional areas, one of which is maritime security. The report discusses progress made and work that remains to be done. Some highlights:

“However, the information system for tracking inspections and efforts to assess the effectiveness of security measures should be improved….We are conducting work examining the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model, as well as reviewing the role that risk plays in the allocation of resources in the Port Security Grant Program… We plan to report the results from our ongoing work later this year.” (p. 106.)

“With regard to foreign seafarers, in January 2011 we reported that because of a lack of technology capability, DHS did not electronically verify identity and immigration status on board cargo vessels, thus limiting assurance that fraud was identified among documents presented by foreign seafarers seeking admission into the United States….For example, both CBP and the Coast Guard track the frequency of absconder (a seafarer CBP has ordered detained on board a vessel in port, but who departs a vessel without permission) and deserter (a seafarer CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who does not return when required) incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably among the two agencies.” (p. 108.)

Concerning the TWIC GAO report: “We recommended, among other things, that DHS assess the program’s internal controls to identify needed corrective actions, assess its effectiveness, and use the information to identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting program objectives. DHS concurred and stated that it has initiated a review of current Transportation Worker Identification Credential program internal controls with a specific focus on the controls highlighted in our May 2011 report. As DHS is in the early stages of implementing these actions, it is too early to assess their impact. Until such efforts are completed, it will be difficult for DHS to provide reasonable assurance that the program is meeting its goals and that only qualified applicants can acquire the credentials.” (p.108.)

Some other interesting extracts from the report are:

“Additionally, Coast Guard records showed that at some ports, a lack of resources hindered some Coast Guard units from meeting their self-imposed requirements for activities, such as escorts and boardings to secure tankers.” (p. 109.)

“In July 2011, DHS reported that it had completed an interagency review of maritime domain awareness requirements which resulted in the publication of a document that included key strategic capabilities, objectives, resources, and evaluative methods needed to maintain maritime domain awareness.” (p. 110.)

About small vessel security, the report states, “We identified limitations in the Coast Guard’s efforts to track vessels at sea. In March 2009, we reported that the means of tracking vessels at sea are potentially effective, but each has features that could impede its effectiveness. Also, the systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports—automatic identification system, radar, and video cameras—had more difficulty tracking smaller and noncommercial vessels because these vessels were not generally required to carry automatic identification system equipment, and because of the technical limitations of radar and cameras. To help address the small vessel threat, DHS developed a Small Vessel Security Strategy in April 2008, and in January 2011 issued the implementation plan for the strategy. As DHS is in the process of executing its implementation plan, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in enhancing

maritime security.” (p. 111.)

Quick Look Report on the Executive Summit for Small Vessel Stakeholder Leadership meeting

The Department of Homeland Security has issued a Quick Look Report on the Executive Summit for Small Vessel Stakeholder Leadership meeting held on March 11, 2011, in Arlington VA, on the release of the Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan. This Report can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-executive-summit-report-03112011.pdf.

RADM Paul Zukunft, USCG Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, described the plan as “a guide for future action” and offered examples of how it would be implemented locally. The plan has a detailed strategic overview, with a layered defense approach containing flexibility to match local requirements. Progress has already been made “to advance interagency operations (centers, and interdiction) and improve coordination between stakeholders.” Area Maritime Security Committees will play a big role in advancing partnership with the localities involved in small vessel security.

More interesting points from the Quick Look Report: during a panel discussion between. Sean Moon, Transportation and Cargo Policy, DHS Office of Policy Development; Mr. Jeff Hoedt, Chief, Office of Boating Safety, USCG; and Mr. Daniel Piscopo, Trusted Traveler Programs, CBP, Mr. Moon stated that “the effort has affected the International Maritime Organization’s small vessel security guidelines and the plans of allied nations.” Moon also stated that another essential part of the plan is “a method to track actions so that the Secretary will know what is happening and what needs to happen to make the plan a success.”

From the Coast Guard, Mr. Hoedt “stated that the USCG approach would be to promote mandatory education of boaters about the threats and measures for safe operation of pleasure craft. The boating community can expect attention to uniform education standards at the federal level that will stress the rules about security zones and vessel ownership documentation.” He indicated that almost all states and territories maintain electronic records of vessel identification, “effectively providing a foundation for a national database.” The USCG has no plans for incorporating RFID as the mian means for vessel identification. The report states that a participant in the audience emphasized the need for support of America’s Waterways Watch and that the participant suggested a number of ways to increase the use of AWW.

Mr. Piscopo described the CBP Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/pleasure_boats/boats/svrs.xml.operators of small pleasure vessels, arriving in the United States from a foreign port or place to include any vessel which has visited a hovering vessel or received merchandise outside the territorial sea, are required to report their arrival to CBP immediately. This system “enables people to enroll online, facilitates an interview process, and grants approval to pre-file float plans. “ It has been extensively beta-tested, and currently has 6,700 members. It is now available in Florida and Puerto Rico but is expected to soon be implemented on the northern border with a subsequent national roll-out. CBP wants the system to be “available on a free and voluntary basis in time for the Memorial Day holiday.”

Another interesting remark was noted in the report by Robert Gauvin, USCG Office of Vessel Activities, who stated that “advances in positioning system technology were being explored to integrate automatic identification system (AIS) and emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) capabilities, making them less expensive and jointly supportive for safety and security.”

During RADM Zukunft’s closing remarks, he stated that the intent is to take advantage of existing technologies, such as Watchkeeper and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software. (WatchKeeper: an information management system that coordinates and organizes port security information to help the Coast Guard and its port partners make the best use of their resources to keep America’s ports safe. From http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/CG9newsletterMar11.pdf)”