GAO Issues Report: Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy

On November 19, 2013, the Government Accountability Office issued GAO Report 14-32, Maritime Security: DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy.  This report is of particular interest to us here at the University of Findlay because our course Small Vessel Security for Rural Communities was recently certified by DHS as AWR 311. The report can be found at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-32. Below are highlights from the report.

From the highlights:

Why GAO did this study: The Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million small vessels operating in the United States in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and largely anonymous. Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit activities. DHS issued its SVSS in April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide actions to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. Given the importance of small vessel security, GAO was asked to review DHS’s efforts in developing and implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan.

  

This report examines what actions, if any, DHS and its components have taken to address small vessel security concerns, and the extent to which they have implemented action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. GAO analyzed DHS documents; interviewed DHS officials; and visited two ports selected on the basis of the volume of small vessel traffic and security initiatives in place, among other things. While the results of the port visits cannot be generalized across all ports, they provided insights on small vessel security issues and operations.

What GAO found: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components—such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—have started or completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) Implementation Plan. “Small vessels” are characterized as any watercraft—regardless of method of propulsion—less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. DHS component officials GAO met with identified examples of key initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small vessel security, including an initiative to help CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign locations and another to assist the Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. Although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and update the plan, DHS has not determined the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders—such as the Department of Defense—are making in completing the action items and has no current plans to do so. DHS officials stated that this is due, in part, to budget constraints that make this a low priority. DHS officials stated that updating the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable, and doing so is particularly important since more than one component could be responsible for action items in the plan. Accordingly, by systematically gathering information from its components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing the action items in the plan, DHS could help prioritize initiatives given constrained budgets and better identify successes and lessons learned, among other things.

What GAO recommends: GAO recommends that DHS regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

From the main body of the report:

DHS officials we spoke with stated that there is no plan to update the SVSS Implementation Plan because it is not a priority, given budget constraints, and it is too early to measure the effectiveness of action items in the plan. According to a senior DHS Policy official, although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS should assess and update the plan annually, given these constraints, an annual review is too frequent. The senior DHS official added that per the Secretary of Homeland Security’s direction, DHS components are focusing on maintaining their ongoing operations under constrained budgets, and so efforts to update the SVSS Implementation Plan are not currently a priority…Coast Guard officials added that America’s Waterway Watch—a program highlighted in the SVSS Implementation Plan that provides outreach to the public, including the small vessel community, on awareness of threats and how to report suspicious activity—may not receive funding in DHS’s fiscal year 2014 appropriation…

DHS officials also stated that because the SVSS Implementation Plan was issued in early 2011, it is too early to expect a majority of the action items to be completed or, especially for the long-term action items, to have been implemented. These officials stated that accomplishing the SVSS’s goals and objectives through implementation of the many action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan will require a significant investment of time and resources, along with buy-in from state and local maritime security stakeholders. Accordingly, it could take years to fully implement some of the action items and determine whether they are effective…

Although it may be too early to measure the effectiveness of some action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, updating the progress made in addressing the action items could help DHS and its components prioritize their efforts given constrained budgets; better identify successes and lessons learned; and enhance collaboration with federal, state, and local stakeholders regarding small vessel security issues. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that, because of risk, the unpredictability of budgets, policy changes, and administrative priorities, the plan must be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains current and accurate. By engaging in this review process, the plan states that it is intended to be a living document that provides a strategic overview of participating agencies’ implementation of the SVSS. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce management’s directives.

Conclusions: Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the United States, DHS issued its SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 to help guide efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small vessels. DHS component agencies have completed some initiatives and have other initiatives under way to address the risk of a small vessel attack, but DHS is not gathering information on the progress its components or relevant stakeholders are making to address action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan and has no plans to do so. The SVSS Implementation Plan, by design, is to be revised to accommodate new information about threats, technologies, requirements, and lessons learned as action items are implemented, but DHS has not updated the plan since it was issued in 2011. Given that internal controls call for federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce management’s directives, DHS could better prioritize initiatives and identify successes if it was to regularly update the progress its components and other relevant stakeholders are making to address the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. This information could be particularly useful to DHS components that may be operating under more constrained budgets than when the plan was first issued.

Recommendation for Executive Action: To improve DHS’s ability to monitor progress, prioritize action items, and identify successes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security systematically gather information from the department’s components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the progress they are making in addressing action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan.

Maritime Security Content of GAO Report On DHS Progress Since 9/11

On Wednesday September 7, 2011, the Government Accountability Office released GAO Report 11-881, “Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11.” Since DHS’ inception in 2003, the GAO has issued over 1,000 products about the agency. Since 2003, “DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. “ This particular report addresses DHS’s progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts.

GAO divided DHS’ homeland security responsibilities into ten functional areas, one of which is maritime security. The report discusses progress made and work that remains to be done. Some highlights:

“However, the information system for tracking inspections and efforts to assess the effectiveness of security measures should be improved….We are conducting work examining the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model, as well as reviewing the role that risk plays in the allocation of resources in the Port Security Grant Program… We plan to report the results from our ongoing work later this year.” (p. 106.)

“With regard to foreign seafarers, in January 2011 we reported that because of a lack of technology capability, DHS did not electronically verify identity and immigration status on board cargo vessels, thus limiting assurance that fraud was identified among documents presented by foreign seafarers seeking admission into the United States….For example, both CBP and the Coast Guard track the frequency of absconder (a seafarer CBP has ordered detained on board a vessel in port, but who departs a vessel without permission) and deserter (a seafarer CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who does not return when required) incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably among the two agencies.” (p. 108.)

Concerning the TWIC GAO report: “We recommended, among other things, that DHS assess the program’s internal controls to identify needed corrective actions, assess its effectiveness, and use the information to identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting program objectives. DHS concurred and stated that it has initiated a review of current Transportation Worker Identification Credential program internal controls with a specific focus on the controls highlighted in our May 2011 report. As DHS is in the early stages of implementing these actions, it is too early to assess their impact. Until such efforts are completed, it will be difficult for DHS to provide reasonable assurance that the program is meeting its goals and that only qualified applicants can acquire the credentials.” (p.108.)

Some other interesting extracts from the report are:

“Additionally, Coast Guard records showed that at some ports, a lack of resources hindered some Coast Guard units from meeting their self-imposed requirements for activities, such as escorts and boardings to secure tankers.” (p. 109.)

“In July 2011, DHS reported that it had completed an interagency review of maritime domain awareness requirements which resulted in the publication of a document that included key strategic capabilities, objectives, resources, and evaluative methods needed to maintain maritime domain awareness.” (p. 110.)

About small vessel security, the report states, “We identified limitations in the Coast Guard’s efforts to track vessels at sea. In March 2009, we reported that the means of tracking vessels at sea are potentially effective, but each has features that could impede its effectiveness. Also, the systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports—automatic identification system, radar, and video cameras—had more difficulty tracking smaller and noncommercial vessels because these vessels were not generally required to carry automatic identification system equipment, and because of the technical limitations of radar and cameras. To help address the small vessel threat, DHS developed a Small Vessel Security Strategy in April 2008, and in January 2011 issued the implementation plan for the strategy. As DHS is in the process of executing its implementation plan, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in enhancing

maritime security.” (p. 111.)

Quick Look Report on the Executive Summit for Small Vessel Stakeholder Leadership meeting

The Department of Homeland Security has issued a Quick Look Report on the Executive Summit for Small Vessel Stakeholder Leadership meeting held on March 11, 2011, in Arlington VA, on the release of the Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan. This Report can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-executive-summit-report-03112011.pdf.

RADM Paul Zukunft, USCG Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, described the plan as “a guide for future action” and offered examples of how it would be implemented locally. The plan has a detailed strategic overview, with a layered defense approach containing flexibility to match local requirements. Progress has already been made “to advance interagency operations (centers, and interdiction) and improve coordination between stakeholders.” Area Maritime Security Committees will play a big role in advancing partnership with the localities involved in small vessel security.

More interesting points from the Quick Look Report: during a panel discussion between. Sean Moon, Transportation and Cargo Policy, DHS Office of Policy Development; Mr. Jeff Hoedt, Chief, Office of Boating Safety, USCG; and Mr. Daniel Piscopo, Trusted Traveler Programs, CBP, Mr. Moon stated that “the effort has affected the International Maritime Organization’s small vessel security guidelines and the plans of allied nations.” Moon also stated that another essential part of the plan is “a method to track actions so that the Secretary will know what is happening and what needs to happen to make the plan a success.”

From the Coast Guard, Mr. Hoedt “stated that the USCG approach would be to promote mandatory education of boaters about the threats and measures for safe operation of pleasure craft. The boating community can expect attention to uniform education standards at the federal level that will stress the rules about security zones and vessel ownership documentation.” He indicated that almost all states and territories maintain electronic records of vessel identification, “effectively providing a foundation for a national database.” The USCG has no plans for incorporating RFID as the mian means for vessel identification. The report states that a participant in the audience emphasized the need for support of America’s Waterways Watch and that the participant suggested a number of ways to increase the use of AWW.

Mr. Piscopo described the CBP Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/pleasure_boats/boats/svrs.xml.operators of small pleasure vessels, arriving in the United States from a foreign port or place to include any vessel which has visited a hovering vessel or received merchandise outside the territorial sea, are required to report their arrival to CBP immediately. This system “enables people to enroll online, facilitates an interview process, and grants approval to pre-file float plans. “ It has been extensively beta-tested, and currently has 6,700 members. It is now available in Florida and Puerto Rico but is expected to soon be implemented on the northern border with a subsequent national roll-out. CBP wants the system to be “available on a free and voluntary basis in time for the Memorial Day holiday.”

Another interesting remark was noted in the report by Robert Gauvin, USCG Office of Vessel Activities, who stated that “advances in positioning system technology were being explored to integrate automatic identification system (AIS) and emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) capabilities, making them less expensive and jointly supportive for safety and security.”

During RADM Zukunft’s closing remarks, he stated that the intent is to take advantage of existing technologies, such as Watchkeeper and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software. (WatchKeeper: an information management system that coordinates and organizes port security information to help the Coast Guard and its port partners make the best use of their resources to keep America’s ports safe. From http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/CG9newsletterMar11.pdf)”

Small Vessel Security - Expanded HIN Rulemaking Withdrawn

On February 11, 2011, in Federal Register Volume 76, Number 29, the Coast Guard announced its decision to not initiate a rulemaking addressing an expanded hull identification number (HIN) for recreational vessels. The Coast Guard had requested comments on the costs and benefits of expanding the existing 12-character HIN in order to provide additional information identifying vessels, and received 29 comments. The Coast Guard made its decision based on consideration of the comments received as well as the challenges from data uncertainty in describing, estimating, and quantifying potential costs and benefits of such a rulemaking. The Federal Register notice stated, In addition to seeking information from the public on an expanded HIN proposal, the Coast Guard also performed its own evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of such a proposal. The Coast Guard found a lack of available data regarding potential costs and benefits.

The notice states in conclusion: “ At this time, the Coast Guard has decided that it is in the best interest of the public and the boating safety community to focus its attention and devote its resources to other regulatory actions. If the Coast Guard decides in the future to reconsider an expanded HIN, we will provide notice in a new Federal Register publication.”

The National Association of State Boating Law Administrators, NASBLA, is among the groups supporting the expanded HIN, stating that it will aid law enforcement officers in quick identification of correctly registered vessels by the type of vessel, hull material, length of vessel, propulsion and fuel type. Through use of the added characters, including a check or verifying digit, our officers on the water will be better able to properly identify suspicious vessels in and around security zones.”

The National Marine Manufacturers Association, which describes itself as “a powerful voice for the recreational boating industry,” is among the groups opposing the expanded HIN, stating that the expanded HIN would “ impose excessive costs on boat builders, and the marine industry as a whole including marine bankers, dealers and distributors and yield no improvement to boating safety.”

Small Vessel Security Plan Report to Public

On Friday March 13, DHS released a public abstract of the Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan, at http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1199394950818.shtm. The Plan itself is sensitive security information and will be distributed only to pre-cleared stakeholders, such as AMSC members.

The Introduction to this document describes the role of the Plan, describing it as “the product of a multi-year process that involved public and private stakeholders, DHS, and other federal, state, local, and tribal authorities. “ It is further described as ” a roadmap for realizing the goals and objectives of the DHS National Small Vessel Security Strategy (Strategy)” that “ identifies possible and proven means of managing and controlling risks posed by the potential threat and possibly dire consequences of small vessel exploitation by terrorists.” The Plan will “improve existing operations and systems by leveraging the actions and resources of stakeholder groups in the commercial private sector and the recreational boating community. “ Discussing how the goals of the SVS Strategy are to be put into practice, DHS states, “Many programs included in the Plan are not new or uniquely dedicated to terrorist threats or small vessels. They are ongoing in the agencies that facilitate maritime safety, security, recreation, and commerce. The Plan outlines improvements to this very substantial base of existing programs to achieve higher levels of operational capability and awareness. By design, it will be continuously revised to accommodate new information about threats, technologies, requirements, and lessons learned as programs are implemented. “

The document then addresses steps forward within the framework of the four goals of the Strategy. Each goal is broken into objectives, and those objectives are put into practice by means of a list of “example activities.” These example activities are excellent initiatives that will certainly strengthen the program and mitigate the threat. Some are just good common sense, such as “Standardize warning signage for limited-access areas, such as Defense Department bases, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers restricted areas, or USCG security zones and for special events and high-threat situations to demarcate security zones and safety zones.” Who will be responsible for what, or how these activities will be funded in these times of cutbacks, is not addressed in this abstract. Despite the claim that these activities are already ongoing within federal agencies, if they are not uniquely dedicated to small vessel security or if small vessel security activity is not separately tracked – requiring expenditure for the tracking – there may be a problem with alignment with federal program management standard practices. Hopefully, there will be details in the SSI version that address these concerns, including checklists and detailed timelines and a solid feedback loop for the port security stakeholder community to contribute their input.

The input of the stakeholder community in this process largely ceased after the Summits, and that wasn’t either the choice or the wish of that community.